Hunton Employment & Labor Perspectives

Last year, the EEOC revealed its Strategic Enforcement Plan (“SEP”) for Fiscal Years 2024-2028.  In the SEP, the EEOC stated that a subject matter priority was “the continued underrepresentation of women and workers of color in certain industries and sectors.”  One such industry focus is on workers in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics) fields. 

The EEOC is asking the Ninth Circuit to clarify the U.S. Supreme Court’s new standard for determining the type of harm that constitutes an adverse job action in discrimination cases and to apply that standard or remand the case at issue so the lower court can apply the new standard.

On July 26, 2024, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) released directive 2024-01 , which outlines updated procedures for expedited pre-enforcement conciliation. The directive provides guidance consistent with the OFCCP’s final rule titled Pre-Enforcement Notice and Conciliation Procedures which went into effect in September of 2023 (You can read our previous article regarding this final rule here).

Many employers today feel pressured to take formal stances on political topics which could impinge on protected categories, such as student protests, abortion access, and Black Lives Matter. Even employers that decline these invitations must effectively manage conflicts between employees over topics such as Israel and Palestine, Russia and Ukraine, or gender-based, religious, or racial implications of opposing political positions, particularly those tied to the upcoming election.

On April 29, 2024, in compliance with President Biden’s October 2023 Executive Order addressing artificial intelligence, the Department of Labor’s Wage & Hour Division (WHD) issued guidance regarding the potential risks posed by employers using AI tools to monitor or augment worker productivity to violate the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).

On February 15, 2024, California lawmakers introduced the bill AB 2930.  AB 2930 seeks to regulate use of artificial intelligence (“AI”) in various industries to combat “algorithmic discrimination.”  The proposed bill defines “algorithmic discrimination” as a “condition in which an automated decision tool contributes to unjustified differential treatment or impacts disfavoring people” based on various protected characteristics including actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, sex, national origin, disability, and veteran status. 

On December 6, 2023, the US Supreme Court heard arguments for Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, which may have significant implications for discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Specifically, the Supreme Court in this case could clarify whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act requires a clear showing of significant disadvantage or tangible harm to have an actionable claim.

Tyson Foods, Inc. (“Tyson”) is no stranger to religious accommodation lawsuits over the impact of its COVID-19 vaccine mandate given its continued efforts to operate through the height of the pandemic in 2021—but the battle just heated up with a proposed class action complaint filed in the Eastern District of Arkansas.

The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) recently published a final rule titled “Pre-enforcement Notice and Conciliation Procedures.”  This rule rescinds the evidentiary standards from the 2020 rule titled “Nondiscrimination Obligations of Federal Contractors and Subcontractors: Procedures to Resolve Potential Employment Discrimination,” which required specific pre-determination notice requirements and certain evidentiary standards. In a blog post, the OFCCP explains that the “new final rule restores flexibility to OFCCP’s pre-enforcement and conciliation procedures, promotes efficiency in resolving cases, strengthens enforcement and promotes alignment of the standards of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”

On June 30, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court in 303 Creative, LLC v. Elenis held that the First Amendment prohibits Colorado from compelling a website designer to engage in expressive conduct that conflicts with her beliefs.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 2020 decision granting anti-discrimination protections for LGBTQ+ workers left room for future challenges by religious employers.

As discussed in prior blog posts, here, here, and here, pay equity is a hot topic for employee retention and compliance. This principle of equal pay for equal work has been mandated since the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and reiterated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. More recently, legislators at the federal, state, and local level have increased their focus on pay equity and pay transparency initiatives. Because of this legislative activity, pay equity has also received increased attention from the Plaintiffs’ bar, and in recent years, pay equity lawsuits have been brought with increasing frequency. Against this backdrop, employers face the tough task of navigating a complex patchwork of pay equity laws in order to achieve fair and legally-compliant compensation practices, while ensuring that their compensation decisions can reflect the reality of a workforce with differing job positions, responsibilities, and performance outcomes.

Virginia joined the list of states limiting employers’ ability to include confidentiality and non-disparagement provisions in employment agreements for matters related to sexual harassment.  But the law’s scope seems limited, and does not appear to apply to post-employment severance agreements.

In Hamilton v. Dallas County, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 223831, 2020 WL 7047055, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2020), a federal district court judge dismissed a lawsuit by female Dallas County detention officers alleging that a gender-based decision related to weekend work schedules violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  At the root of that case was the fact that, although male and female officers received the same number of days off during a workweek, only male officers were permitted to take both weekend days off.  The female officers complained about the scheduling policy, but the County maintained the policy, citing safety concerns. 

Lost in the weeds of recent COVID-19 news is the increasing number of states and localities that have legalized medicinal and recreational use of marijuana.  Such legalization brings with it varying degrees of worker protections and employer obligations.  Philadelphia, PA and the state of Montana are two of the latest jurisdictions to add their names to the sprouting list of jurisdictions that protect not only medical use, but also recreational use of marijuana.  These protections will undoubtedly usher in a new wave of test cases and compliance questions, particularly as many workplaces shift to remote models.

Governor Newsom has signed SB 331 (the “Silenced No More Act”) into law.  As discussed in our prior blog post, SB 331 will expand the existing restrictions on the confidentiality provisions recently put into place by SB 820 (which restricts the usage of confidentiality provisions in agreements related to sexual assault, harassment, or harassment) to also restrict the usage of confidentiality provisions related to all claims of harassment, discrimination, or retaliation under the FEHA.

California already has prohibitions on including non-disclosure provisions in certain settlement agreements related to sexual harassment.  Now California seeks to expand these prohibitions by enacting the Proposed California SB-331 (“Silenced No More Act”).  The new Act aims to prohibit provisions within any agreement that prevent or restrict the disclosure of factual information of claims related to harassment, discrimination, and retaliation.  The proposed bill recently passed senate and assembly, and if approved by governor, will become effective January 1, 2022.

On June 30, 2021, President Biden signed a joint resolution narrowly passed by Congress to repeal a Trump-era rule that would have increased the EEOC’s information-sharing requirements during the statutorily mandated conciliation process.

Employers remember the seminal Supreme Court decision in Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga., where the Court held that Title VII’s “because of sex” protections extend to sexual orientation and transgender status.  (See our previous blog entry.)   Now, on the one-year anniversary of that influential case, the EEOC has issued guidance to clarify whether employers can segregate bathrooms by gender or sex.  That question was conspicuously left unresolved in Bostock.

Uber Technologies, Inc. has been sued in a class action lawsuit alleging the company’s use of criminal background checks discriminates against Black and Latinx drivers. The complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on April 8, challenges Uber’s “unlawful use of criminal history to discriminate against its drivers in New York City as well as its brazen noncompliance with human rights and fair credit laws.”

Named plaintiff Job Golightly, a Black resident of Bronx County, New York, drove for Uber from 2014 through August 2020. Golightly claims that his criminal history consists of a single 2013 misdemeanor speeding violation from Virginia. According to the lawsuit, until 2017 Uber had relied solely on background checks conducted by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC). Plaintiffs allege that in mid-2017, in response to negative news coverage on assaults committed by drivers, Uber began using the credit reporting agency Checkr to conduct additional background checks on current and prospective drivers. As a result, in August 2020 Uber allegedly conducted a background check on Golightly that revealed his 2013 speeding violation. One day later, Golightly claims that Uber deactivated him from its platform, preventing him from driving for the company.

Covid-19 has left employers who want their employees back in the office in a difficult position. With the pandemic still raging, many employees are fearful of returning to the office with unvaccinated peers. In order to ease their employees’ concerns and provide a safe work environment, some employers are offering incentives to get vaccinated. Some existing vaccine incentives include gift cards, time off after receiving the second dose, pay for the time spent getting the vaccine, or bonuses ranging from $75 to $500. Although offering vaccine incentives may seem like a solution at this time, employers should be mindful of the legal ramifications of providing their employees with incentives for receiving the vaccine.

Since taking office, President Biden has issued Executive Orders covering topics from climate change to mask mandates.  Some of these new Executive Orders are aimed at eliminating discrimination and promoting equity at the federal level.  These directives will likely result in new requirements for private sector companies that are government contractors or subcontractors, and could require them to revise practices and policies in order to keep, or procure new, government contracts.

On November 17, 2020 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released proposed updates to its Compliance Manual on Religious Discrimination (“Manual”). The draft revisions are available for public input until December 17, 2020, after which the EEOC will consider the public’s input, make any changes, and publish the finalized Manual.

Last month, a court in the N.D. of California denied class certification to a group of Chipotle workers who alleged that the burrito chain maintained unlawful English-only workplaces in the state of California.  Guzman v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-02606 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2020).  The opinion is a textbook example of how a lack of uniform written policies can, in some instances, benefit employers defending pattern and practice lawsuits.  Separately, the case also provides occasion to review the EEOC’s stance on English-Only policies.

Dollar General and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) recently settled a six-year-old Title VII lawsuit.  The EEOC brought its race discrimination claim on behalf of a Charging Party and a class of Black job applicants, alleging that Dollar General’s use of criminal justice history information in the hiring process had a disparate impact on Black applicants.

The United States District Court for the Western District of New York recently granted an early dismissal of a class action lawsuit prior to class certification.  Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 18-CV-6591 CJS, 2019 WL 3237361, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019). The plaintiffs in Mandala were two African-American men who applied for and were offered jobs with the defendant employer.  After the employer conducted a criminal background check on the plaintiffs and found they each had a felony criminal conviction, the employer withdrew their job offers.  The plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the employer alleging claims for disparate impact race discrimination under Title VII, and violations of New York state laws prohibiting criminal history discrimination and regulating the background check process.

After languishing on the docket for almost a year, the United States Supreme Court agreed today to hear three cases concerning the scope of Title VII’s protections for LGBT employees.  The Court is now set to decide two separate, but related questions: (1) whether Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and (2) whether Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of transgendered status.

As we previously reported here, here, and here,  there has been a wave of federal court litigation over the last two years on this topic, with various ...

In one of the most anticipated decisions of the term, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, dodged the key constitutional questions in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, issuing a narrow opinion finding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission displayed “impermissible hostility” toward a baker’s sincerely held religious beliefs.

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) not only prohibits discrimination, harassment and retaliation, but goes a step farther than similar state laws in its explicit requirement that employers take reasonable steps to prevent and correct such conduct.  Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k).  In 2016, the California Fair Employment and Housing Council promulgated regulations which set forth the required elements of a compliant prevention and correction program (2 CCR §§ 11023-11024), and in May 2017 the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) issued a Workplace Harassment Guide (the “Guide”) to clarify further employers’ obligations under these regulations.  

On June 30, 2017, Missouri Governor Eric Greitens signed a bill into law, Senate Bill 43 (SB 43), that makes substantial changes to Missouri’s employment discrimination laws. The Bill, which goes into effect on August 28, amends the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) and creates the “Whistle Blower Protection Act.”

Numerous changes have been made to the MHRA, so the Bill is worth a read.  A few key changes that are likely of particular interest to employers relate to who may be liable for violations, the level of proof required to establish a violation, and the amount of damages that may be awarded.

In a ceremonial signing on June 22, Philadelphia Mayor Jim Kenney signed a new municipal bill giving the City of Philadelphia authority to temporarily close businesses found to have repeatedly violated the City’s anti-discrimination statutes.  The new bill, which amends the City’s Fair Practices Ordinance, states that the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations may, “upon a finding that [an employer] has engaged in severe or repeated violations without effective efforts to remediate the violations, order that the [employer] cease its business operations in the City for a specified period of time.” The bill, which went into effect immediately, does not state how long a business may be closed.  Nor does it define “severe or repeated violations” or clarify what constitutes “effective efforts to remediate.”

At the request of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the New York Court of Appeals recently answered several questions regarding liability under the New York Human Rights Law Section 296(15)—which prohibits denying employment on the basis of criminal convictions when doing so violates New York Correction Law Article 23-A—and Section 296(6)—which prohibits aiding and abetting such discrimination.

In a landmark ruling on April 4, 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, became the first federal appellate court to officially recognize a discrimination claim under Title VII based solely on the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.  The Court’s decision in Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana reflects a groundswell of recent cases questioning whether sexual orientation claims are viable under Title VII.  Although the Seventh Circuit is the only appellate court so far to hold that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of “sex” discrimination under Title VII, recent panel decisions from the Second and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals signal that additional circuit courts might be poised to overrule existing case law to find similar protections.

Effective March 17, 2017, the District of Columbia will join a dozen other jurisdictions across the country that prohibit an employer’s use of “credit information” in employment decisions.  The new law, D.C. Act 21-673, amends the District of Columbia’s existing human rights law by adding credit information as a prohibited basis for discrimination for any employment decision (not just hiring), and applies to employers of any size.  See D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a)(1) and (a)(1)(4)(D), as amended.

The Trump Administration will leave in place an executive order signed by President Barack Obama, which bans sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination by federal contractors.  President Obama signed the order in 2014.  By doing so, he amended and expanded previous executive orders signed by Presidents Nixon and Clinton, which ban discrimination by federal contractors on the basis race, color, religion, sex, national origin, handicap, status as a parent, and age.

Donald Trump's election took many by surprise. Companies must now quickly determine his likely impact on their operations and workforces.

Trump will be the first US president with no government or military experience. He voiced extreme views during his campaign on immigration and discrimination, but he has played it close to the vest when it comes to other labor and employment law issues. What is clear is that Trump will have the backing of a GOP-controlled House and Senate. Does this mean employers will see radical changes in policy? Will the change to a Republican administration ...

The Ninth Circuit has joined both the Sixth and Fifth circuits in holding that USERRA claims are subject to arbitration pursuant to an employee’s agreement to arbitrate employment related claims.  See Ziober v. BLB Resources, Inc., 2016 WL 5956733 (9^th Cir. Oct. 14, 2016).  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit, a traditionally pro-employee circuit, has assuaged any fear of uncertainty that employers may have had with respect to their rights to compel arbitration of USERRA claims.

On October 5, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that an unsuccessful job applicant “cannot sue an employer for disparate impact [under § 4(a)(2) of the ADEA] because [an] applicant has no ‘status as an employee.’”  Villarreal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., --- F.3d ---, No. 15-10602, 2016 WL 5800001, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 5, 2016).

Enforcing a race-neutral grooming policy that prohibits employees from wearing dreadlocks is not intentional racial discrimination under Title VII.  That is what the Eleventh Circuit recently held in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, --- F.3d ---, No. 14-13482, 2016 WL 4916851 (11th Cir. Sept. 15, 2016).

On March 1, 2016, the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) sued employers for the first time for sexual orientation discrimination. The EEOC filed lawsuits in federal courts in Pittsburgh and Baltimore against manufacturing and health care employers for unlawful sex discrimination on behalf of employees alleging they were harassed and discriminated against based on their sexual orientation.

In February of 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released detailed information and statistics summarizing the charges of discrimination that the agency received throughout its 2015 fiscal year. The EEOC is the administrative agency charged with implementing and enforcing a number of federal anti-discrimination employment statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Under each of these statutes, employees seeking to bring a claim of unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation must first file a charge with the EEOC. The recently released report provides helpful information regarding the types of charges that employees filed in the 2015 fiscal year, which ran from October 1, 2014 to September 20, 2015.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) is asking the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to recognize that discrimination based on an employee’s sexual orientation constitutes unlawful discrimination “because of . . . sex,” in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

The EEOC advances this argument in an amicus brief in support of Barbara Burrows, a lesbian college professor and administrator who claims she was subjected to sex discrimination by her former employer, the College of Central Florida, based on her same-sex marriage and how she looked and acted. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the College, holding that Burrows’s sex discrimination claim was “merely a repackaged claim for discrimination based on sexual orientation, which is not cognizable under Title VII.” Burrows appealed, and the case is currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit.

On December 7, 2015, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania permitted a plaintiff to pursue discrimination claims alleging that she had been forced to retire as a result of her age and disability status—despite the fact that she had voluntarily agreed to retire as part of a union grievance settlement. This case, Melan v. Belle Vernon Area School District, serves as a warning to employers settling grievances under a collective bargaining agreement that implicate employees’ federally protected rights.

On November 3, 2015, Houston voters rejected Proposition 1, a broadly-worded human rights ordinance that would have made it illegal to discriminate on the basis of, among other things, gender identity. Opposition to that ordinance coalesced around the issue of restrooms, with many citizens expressing fear that the law would allow men to use women’s restrooms.

This week, the EEOC announced that an Illinois-based packing company, Pactiv LLC, agreed to pay $1.7 million to resolve a charge alleging that the company discriminated against employees who needed time off from work for medical reasons.

According to the EEOC, the company maintained a nationwide policy that assessed “attendance points” to employees who needed time off for medical reasons. The company also allegedly failed to provide employees with intermittent and extended leave as a “reasonable accommodation” under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

In its recent decision in David Baldwin v. Dep’t of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (July 15, 2015), the EEOC ruled that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, despite the fact that Title VII does not explicitly include sexual orientation or gender identity in its list of protected bases.

The Supreme Court recently held in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. that Title VII prohibits a prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant in order to avoid accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate without undue hardship, even where the applicant has not informed the employer of his need for an accommodation.

The Fourth District California Court of Appeal recently held that a Department of Corrections employee’s claim that he was constructively discharged after being discriminated against on the basis of his religion—“Sun Worshipping Atheism”—was properly dismissed.  Marshel Copple is the founding and only member of a religion he calls Sun Worshipping Atheism, the core tenets of which include: praying in the sun; taking in fresh air on a daily basis; sleeping at least 8 hours per day; eating and drinking when necessary; frequent exercise; daily rest; and engaging in frequent social activities.

“Ban the Box” Laws

At least thirteen states, the District of Columbia, and almost 100 cities and counties have passed so-called “ban the box” laws, which restrict the scope of permissible investigations into job applicants’ criminal history, and, in some cases, the timing of such inquiries.

Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws which decriminalize the use of marijuana for medical purposes.  Under those statutory schemes, individuals with qualified medical conditions may become registered cardholders and obtain cannabis for medical purposes, often from state-regulated dispensaries.  These developments present an array of new challenges for employers to navigate.

Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk
Oral argument was heard on October 8, 2014.  This case will resolve a circuit split on whether time spent by warehouse workers going through security is paid time.  The Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended by the Portal to Portal Act, does not require an employer to compensate for activities that are preliminary or postliminary to their principle work.  29 U.S.C. §254(a)(2).  The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, but the Ninth Circuit ruled against Integrity Solutions, a contractor to Amazon.com, holding that going through security was an “integral and indispensable” part of the shift and not a non-compensable postliminary activity.  The Second and Eleventh Circuits previously held that time in security screening is not compensable time.  Interestingly, the U.S. Department of Labor filed an amicus brief on the side of Integrity Staffing.

On November 6, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit reined in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) use of a broad administrative subpoena in an investigation of an individual charge of discrimination.  The case is EEOC v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines Ltd.

The EEOC and the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs recently signed a National Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The purpose of the MOU, according to an EEOC press release, is to strengthen the collaborative efforts of the United States and Mexico to inform immigrant, migrant and Mexican workers of their rights under the EEOC’s non-discrimination laws. The MOU is also directed at employers, aiming to provide guidance on their responsibilities under the same laws.  The MOU was signed in both English and Spanish by EEOC Chair Jacqueline A. Berrien and Ambassador Eduardo Medina Mora, at the EEOC headquarters in Washington, D.C.

In response to a presidential memorandum directing the Department of Labor (“DOL”) to collect summary compensation data from federal contractors and subcontractors to combat pay discrimination, the DOL’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP”) recently proposed a rule calling on certain federal contractors to submit reports on employee compensation.  The rule, published in the Federal Register on August 8, requires covered contractors to annually submit an “Equal Pay Report.” Covered federal contractors and subcontractors are those who:

• File EEO-1 reports;
• Have more than 100 employees; and
• Hold federal contracts or subcontracts worth $50,000 or more for at least 30 days.

Illinois recently joined a growing number of states and municipalities that have passed “ban the box” laws regulating when employers can inquire into an applicant’s criminal history. 

On July 21, President Obama signed an Executive Order adding sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of protected categories included in Executive Order 11246, originally issued by President Johnson in 1965.  E.O. 11246 now prohibits federal contractors from discriminating against employees or applicants for employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, sexual orientation or gender identity.

On July 14, 2014, the Council of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Council”) unanimously voted to “ban the box,” approving a bill that will restrict when an employer may ask a job applicant about his criminal background.  The bill will now go to Mayor Vincent Gray for his signature, and then to Congress for approval.

On June 30, 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted Mach Mining LLC’s petition for writ of certiorari, agreeing to take up the question of whether and to what extent courts may enforce the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (“EEOC”) duty to conciliate a case prior to bringing a lawsuit.

On March 6, 2014, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) released guidance pertaining to employers’ responsibilities to accommodate religious dress and grooming in the workplace.  

The guidance provides explanation and analysis concerning an employer’s responsibilities under Title VII to “make exceptions to their usual rules or preferences to permit applicants and employees to follow religiously-mandated dress and grooming practices unless it would pose an undue hardship to the operation of an employer’s business.”

Recently, the Maryland Senate passed a bill, called the Fairness for All Marylanders Act of 2014, that would prohibit discrimination against transgender individuals in employment and other areas.  By doing so, the state moves closer to making transgendered individuals a protected class.  The bill must still pass the House of Delegates before it may be signed into law.  Four localities in Maryland have already passed laws barring discrimination against individuals on the basis of gender identity; Baltimore City and Baltimore, Howard and Montgomery counties.  If the bill is enacted, Maryland would join over one dozen other states that have similarly banned discrimination on gender identity, including such states as California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and Washington.

On November 4, the state of Texas sued the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Jacqueline A. Berrien (in her official capacity as chair of the EEOC), requesting a federal district court to declare invalid the EEOC’s enforcement guidance on employers’ use of arrest and conviction records and to enjoin the EEOC from using this guidance against the state and its agencies. Texas v. EEOC, No. 5:13-cv-00255-C (N.D. Tex.).

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The EEOC recently settled a national origin discrimination case involving a “restrictive language policy” or “English-only rule.”  EEOC v. Mesa Systems, Inc., 2:11-cv-01201 (D. Utah 2013).  The employer agreed to pay $450,000.00 and to provide a variety of injunctive relief, including training, policy revisions, apologies, notice postings, and reporting to the EEOC.  The EEOC’s Strategic Enforcement Plan made it a priority to protect the most “vulnerable workers,” and Commissioner Jacqueline Berrien said the settlement is an important demonstration of a “renewed commitment” to that goal.  And, indeed: this settlement is the latest in a decade-long line of EEOC enforcement actions based on English-only rules.  See, e.g.: $2.44 million settlement with University of Incarnate Word (2001); $700,000 settlement with Premier Operator Services, Inc. (2000).

On October 7, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the imposition of fees and costs against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in EEOC v. Peoplemark, Inc., Case No. 11-2582, for knowingly pursuing a meritless claim in which the agency alleged that Peoplemark’s criminal background check policy had a disparate impact on minority job applicants.  The EEOC recently has moved aggressively to enforce its April 2012 guidance regarding the use of criminal background checks in hiring.  That guidance appears to suggest that any criminal background check policy may be vulnerable to an EEOC enforcement action under a disparate impact theory—regardless of its terms and the manner in which it is implemented—solely on the basis of national data that show disproportionate rates of incarceration for African-Americans and Hispanics.  However, the Peoplemark decision, of which the EEOC presently seeks en banc review, also heralds an emerging pattern of judicial skepticism towards the agency’s enforcement tactics and its efforts to pursue disparate impact claims premised solely on national statistical evidence that is unrelated to any specific employer practice.

In a 2-1 decision, the Tenth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the EEOC on its claim that Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. failed to provide an applicant with a reasonable religious accommodation and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Abercrombie.

On October 2, 2013, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed into law an amendment to the city’s Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), expanding the scope of the pregnancy discrimination protections provided under the law.  Although discrimination on the basis of an employee’s pregnancy has long been prohibited under the NYCHRL, as well as under state and federal law, the new amendment makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to reasonably accommodate “the needs of an employee for her pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” 

EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS

Vance v. Ball State University: Narrow Definition of Supervisor in Harassment Suits
In Vance, the Supreme Court announced a narrow standard for determining which employees constitute “supervisors” for purposes of establishing vicarious liability under Title VII. In a 5-4 decision, the Court decided that a supervisor is a person authorized to take “tangible employment actions,” such as hiring, firing, promoting, demoting or reassigning employees to significantly different responsibilities. The majority opinion rejected the EEOC’s ...

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) announced that it won what it describes as a “historic” verdict last week when an Iowa federal jury awarded $240 million to a group of intellectually disabled plant workers who were subjected to disability-based discrimination and harassment.  The award is the largest in the agency’s history.  The EEOC’s General Counsel, David Lopez, remarked that the verdict is “one of the EEOC's finest moments in its ongoing efforts to combat employment discrimination.”

On March 13, 2013,  the New York City Council, over Mayor Bloomberg’s veto, passed a law prohibiting discrimination against the unemployed in hiring.  The law, effective June 11, 2013, amends the New York City Human Rights Law to expand the class of protected individuals to include the unemployed.  The law applies to employers in New York City who employ four or more persons (including employees and/or independent contractors).  The law defines an unemployed person as someone “not having a job, being available for work, and seeking employment” and prohibits covered employers from basing employment decisions “with regard to hiring, compensation or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment on an applicant’s unemployment.”  Additionally, it prohibits all employers from advertising that a particular position requires applicants to be currently employed or that the employer will not consider applicants who are unemployed.

Effective February 28, 2013, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (“OFCCP” or “Office”) has rescinded two guidance documents implemented during the Bush administration that outlined methods for investigating and evaluating pay discrimination claims against federal contractors and replaced them with new guidelines emphasizing a case-by-case approach that provides investigators with authority to conduct more thorough investigations and identify a broader range of compensation-related discrimination.  The first document, Interpreting Nondiscrimination Requirements of Executive Order 11246 With Respect to Systemic Compensation Discrimination (“Compensation Standards”), set forth the procedures OFCCP followed when issuing a notice of violation for pay discrimination; and the second document, Voluntary Guidelines for Self-Evaluation of Compensation Practices for Compliance with Nondiscrimination Requirements of Executive Order 11246 (“Voluntary Guidelines”), contained directions that federal contractors themselves could follow to preemptively show compliance with their obligation to evaluate their internal pay practices for fairness.

In Harris v. City of Santa Monica, No. S181004 (Cal. Feb. 7, 2013), the California Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can establish a claim of employment discrimination by showing that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the decision-making process.  The Supreme Court also held that even if a plaintiff establishes that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor in the decision-making process, the defendant is entitled to establish a “mixed motive” defense by proving that legitimate factors would have been sufficient, absent the discrimination, to produce the same decision.  On the surface, these two holdings appear contradictory.  That each of those propositions is true highlights the significance of the Court’s rulings on remedies.  Even if the defendant establishes its mixed motive – or same-decision – defense, that defense does not immunize the employer from liability.  Instead, the plaintiff may potentially be entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief, and may recover attorneys’ fees even though the employer successfully establishes its defense.

On April 25, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission  adopted its Enforcement Guidance: Consideration of Arrest - Conviction Records in Employment Decisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“2012 Guidance”), expanding on its 1987 and later policy statements to its field offices.

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The EEOC is targeting pregnancy discrimination in several states.  The EEOC has filed a string of recent cases in an apparent attempt to crack down on workplace discrimination against pregnant women.  A California-based security guard contractor was recently sued by the EEOC on September 20 after it terminated a female employee when she tried to return to work after her pregnancy leave.  A week later, a Texas-based restaurant was also sued after terminating eight pregnant employees. The restaurant allegedly had in place a written policy that instructed managers to terminate pregnant employees three months into their pregnancies.  One of the fired employees was terminated pursuant to the policy even though her doctor had cleared her to work without restrictions until the 36th week of her pregnancy.   In another restaurant-related complaint, this one filed September 27, the EEOC sued a Florida-based restaurant in Panama City, Florida for terminating two pregnant waitresses.  According to the EEOC, the restaurant told pregnant workers that their pregnancies made them a “liability” to the company.  In a related matter, the EEOC is seeking an injunction against a Michigan juvenile detention center to prevent it from maintaining a policy that requires women to immediately notify the company when they become pregnant.

We live in a society that is obsessed with appearance, and studies show that many people equate appearance to success.  While employers may not be aware of these studies, some are trying to control appearance in the workplace by imposing weight restrictions on job applicants or employees as a condition of employment.  

Whether these policies are permissible can only be answered with a “maybe.” 

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A recent case from Ohio highlights the evolution of both “cat’s paw” liability and “gender stereotyping” claims in employment litigation.  In Koren v. The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, No. 1:11-cv-2674 (N.D.Ohio Aug. 14, 2012), plaintiff Jason Koren, then known as Jason Cabot, first worked for Ohio Bell from 2000 to 2006.  He told his co-workers he was gay and had AIDS.   He left his employment on good terms and subsequently married his partner in Massachusetts, taking his husband’s last name of Koren.  Koren was rehired by Ohio Bell as a sales consultant in 2009.   Koren alleged one of his managers refused to recognize his marriage or name change and persisted in calling him Cabot.  Koren also described a number of allegedly discriminatory job actions.  In 2009, Koren’s father died, and he missed nine days of work.  Ohio Bell terminated Koren for excessive absences.  He sued for gender and disability discrimination under Federal and Ohio law.

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Once an employer becomes aware of an employee’s disability, the ADA requires the employer to provide a “reasonable accommodation” to enable the employee to perform the essential functions of his or her job.  While the type of reasonable accommodation required can vary greatly depending on an employee’s disability and essential job functions, it was not until recently that a court found that permitting an employee to work in natural light can be a reasonable accommodation.

The EEOC is appealing the recent decision in EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., et al., Case No. H-11-2442 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012), which dismissed a complaint filed by the EEOC, and held that “firing someone because of lactation or breast-pumping is not sex discrimination.”  The District Court stated that even if the EEOC could prove that Houston Funding had fired an employee because she sought permission to pump breast milk at the office, the agency would not have a Title VII claim because lactation is not pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently ruled that discrimination on the basis of immigration status is not covered under Title VII.  In Cortezano v. Salin Bank & Trust Co., No. 11-1631, the facts involved spouses Kristi and Javier Cortezano.  Javier was an unauthorized immigrant from Mexico, while his wife Kristi was employed as a sales manager at Salin Bank. When Kristi’s supervisor discovered Javier’s unauthorized immigrant status, the bank initiated a process that ultimately led to Kristi’s termination.  Kristi filed suit against Salin Bank alleging, among other things, employment discrimination under Title VII.  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted Salin Bank’s motion for summary judgment. 

In what has roundly been hailed as a landmark decision, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) held in Macy v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (April 20, 2012) that, although no federal statute explicitly prohibits employment discrimination based on gender identity, transgender individuals may nonetheless state a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII.

On May 21, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in a split decision that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) does not bar discrimination based on marijuana use unless that use is authorized under federal law.  In James v. City of Costa Mesa, No. 10–55769, the court held that even marijuana use under a doctor’s supervision in accordance with state law was not protected under the ADA.  The court held that the ADA excludes illegal drug users from its definition of qualified individuals with a disability.  Although generally-applicable California drug laws carve out an exception for uses of marijuana for medical purposes under doctor supervision, there are no such exceptions to the federal Controlled Substances Act.  Since the ADA defines “illegal drug use” by reference to federal law, and the federal law does not authorize marijuana use for medical purposes, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that discrimination in the provision of public services based on marijuana use was not prohibited by the ADA.

In Victoria, Texas, the Citizens Medical Center prohibits hiring obese employees.  The hospital promulgated a policy that requires all potential employees to have a body mass index (BMI) of less than 35.  For example, an applicant who is 5-foot-5 could not weigh more than 210 pounds, and an applicant who is 5-foot-10 could not weigh more than 245 pounds.  All potential employees are screened by a physician to assess their fitness for duty.  According to the hospital’s policy, an employee’s physical appearance “should fit with a representational image or specific mental projection of the job of a health care professional.”

On March 12, 2012, OSHA issued a memorandum expanding on specific policies and practices that OSHA asserts can discourage employees from reporting workplace injuries or illnesses, and thus, violate the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act” or “Act”) and/or the Federal Railroad Safety Act (“FRSA”).  Intended as guidance to both field compliance officers and whistleblower investigative staff, the memorandum notes four programs or practices that, while potentially useful to management as a metric for safety performance, cannot be condoned without careful scrutiny because of the risk they could chill employee reporting of workplace injuries or illnesses.

Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, there has been a significant amount of educated speculation about the effect of that decision on class action litigation in general and more particularly on class actions involving claims of employment discrimination.  Dukes is seen as creating an impassable barrier for class actions claiming discrimination in multiple locations based on excess subjectivity arising from decentralized decision-making.  Dukes instead focuses the inquiry on the existence and discriminatory effect of enterprise-wide policies such as an employment test or standardized performance criterion.  The question remains: what constitutes an enterprise-wide policy or practice?  This is a question that has challenged practitioners since General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n. 15 (1982), and before.

On February 28, 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued additional guidance to wounded veterans and to employers under the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.  The two publications are revised versions of guides that originally were posted by the EEOC in February 2008. This guidance reflects another move by federal agencies to address the employment of disabled persons.  Last December, we reported that the OFCCP issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would, among other things, establish a national utilization goal for individuals with disabilities. There is certainly more than one indication from the federal government that employers will likely continue to face heightened responsibilities concerning the employment of disabled individuals.

In its decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009), the Supreme Court sought to resolve a conflict between the “twin pillars of Title VII,” the Act’s disparate-impact and disparate-treatment provisions.  Ricci involved a promotional examination administered by the City of New Haven.  After candidates took the examination, the City refused to certify the test results because of a concern that the test had a disparate impact on African-American candidates and would lead to the promotion of white candidates.

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On December 6, 2011, just five days after it heard oral arguments in the case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a victory for a transgender woman, Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn, who sued her former employer, the Georgia state legislature, for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.  A three-judge panel unanimously affirmed a summary judgment for the plaintiff, who was fired from the General Office of Legislative Council for undergoing a gender transition.

On December 8, 2011 the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (the “OFCCP”) published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the Federal Register that would revise the regulations implementing Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, including setting hiring goals for individuals with disabilities.

Thirty-four percent of adults in the United States presently qualify as obese under standards adopted by the Center for Disease Control.  Morbid obesity (defined as having a body weight more than 100% over the norm) and obesity caused by a psychological disorder are "disabilities" as defined by the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), according to the EEOC.  Lawsuits involving morbid obesity are on the rise and come in many shapes and sizes.  The most common involves a “substantially limiting” health condition such as diabetes, heart disease, and hypertension.  Others involve employers who assume an obese employee would pose a direct threat to the health and safety of him or herself or other employees if he or she were to carry out the essential functions of the job.

California Governor Jerry Brown recently signed into law Senate Bill No. 559 (SB 559), which prohibits discrimination based on an individual’s genetic information.  While SB 559 significantly expands the protections from genetic discrimination provided under the federal Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), at this time, its impact on most California employers is thought to be limited to the potential for greater damages to be awarded under it than under its federal counterpart.

In the current economy, with unemployment over 9% and multiple applicants for every position, an out-of-work individual should be doing everything possible to get a new job, right? Perhaps, but not for purposes of “mitigation” under fair employment statutes.

On August 11, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York ruled that a fired employee alleging discriminatory discharge under Title VII had no obligation to enroll in vocational training in order to mitigate his damages from the alleged discrimination. EEOC v. Dresser Rand Co., No. 04-CV-66300, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89466 (Aug. 11, 2011).

The national unemployment rate, as reported by the Department of Labor, has stubbornly remained at about 9% or higher for more than two years. As many of these unemployed individuals search for new jobs, some have purportedly been denied available employment opportunities simply because they were unemployed. Unemployment discrimination, as it is often called, is not currently prohibited under federal law. The EEOC and Congress, however, have taken steps focused on so-called unemployment discrimination that could affect how employers conduct their hiring processes.

On July 8th, partially relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 20th decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (for an analysis of the Dukes decision, see our previous blog entry), the United States District Court for the Northern District of California decertified a class of current and former store managers who alleged that Dollar Tree Stores Inc. had misclassified them as exempt employees and denied them overtime pay.  The case, Cruz v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., proves that although Dukes involved discrimination as opposed to wage and hour claims, the rationale in Dukes can also be used to defeat wage and hour class actions.

This week, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in what has been called the “most important class action case in more than a decade.”  In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, et al., No. 10-277, 564 U.S. ___ (June 20, 2010), the plaintiffs, current and former employees of the Nation’s largest private employer, Wal-Mart, sought judgment against the company for injunctive and declaratory relief, punitive damages, and backpay, on behalf of themselves and a nationwide class of some 1.5 million female employees, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

A recent Tenth Circuit decision sends a strong message that the court takes seriously the jurisdictional prerequisite that plaintiffs exhaust their administrative remedies in a Title VII claim prior to taking a claim to court.  The process to do so is well-known -- before an employee can file a lawsuit alleging discrimination against his or her employer, he or she must file a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  Requiring individuals to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing a lawsuit serves, hopefully, to eliminate facially meritless charges, facilitate internal resolution, and help avoid litigation.  This is often the case, as many charges filed with the EEOC never end up on a court’s docket.  But what happens if the parties are already enmeshed in litigation and the plaintiff claims that the defendant’s conduct during the course of that litigation is retaliatory?  Can the plaintiff amend his or her complaint to include that allegation?  Or must he or she go back to the EEOC and file a charge for that claim?  In McDonald-Cuba v. Santa Fe Protective Services, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that the latter is true.  No. 10-2151 (10th Cir. May 9, 2011).  The Fourth came down the other way in a similar case.

Earlier this month, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the “cat’s paw” theory of employment discrimination -- that an employer can be liable for the discriminatory animus of an employee who influences, but does not make, an ultimate employment decision -- applies to claims brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), the law that protects individuals called to military service during their private employment.  In a unanimous decision, the Court held that

“if a supervisor performs an act motivated by anti-military animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.”

Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011).

The 2010 fiscal year was a busy one for the EEOC as employees filed a record number of charges.  See A Year In Review: EEOC Charges & Trends.  This wave of charges is historic -- not just because of the number of charges filed, but also because of the evolving trends in the types of claims made. Unfortunately for employers, these trends will likely continue in 2011 and beyond.

Historically, the most common types of claims filed were those of race and sex discrimination. Although these particular types of claims remain prevalent (the number of both race and sex discrimination claims increased in 2010), other types of claims are emerging at an alarming rate due to recent changes in the legal landscape.

Expanding on our December 21 post, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on January 11, 2011, announced that private sector workplace discrimination charge filings reached the “unprecedented level” of 99,922 during fiscal year 2010, which ended on September 30, 2010.  According to the data, all major categories of charge filings in the private sector, including charges against state and local governments, increased significantly.

The fiscal year 2010 was a record-setting year for the number of private-sector discrimination charges filed with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  Nearly 100,000 charges were filed -- the most charges in the commission’s  45-year history.  This number represents an increase of just over seven percent from 2009, becoming the third consecutive year in which over 90,000 charges were filed.

It is not uncommon in discrimination and harassment suits for employers to battle against the admission of so called “me too” evidence.  Plaintiffs often employ the tactic of parading up other employees who claim they were discriminated against and/or harassed in the same manner as the plaintiff.  The results vary based on jurisdiction and fact pattern, and the standards can differ by jurisdiction and court.  The United States Supreme Court may soon add some clarity to this area.  The Court is considering whether to review a case involving the appeal of Billy Ray Tratree, an African-American employee who was discharged three months before he turned age 50 and was to become eligible for retirement benefits.  Tratree alleges that his employer discharged him on the basis of his race and age.  The Supreme Court soon will decide whether to review the Fifth Circuit’s opinion upholding the district court’s decision to exclude some of Tratree’s “me too” evidence.

It is very difficult to control everything employees say in the workplace, and to stamp out every inappropriate comment, particularly in a large workforce.  The reality is that out of place remarks happen all the time in the workplace, and every single improper comment cannot lead to legal liability for employers, or commerce would come to a complete stop.  Courts have recognized this reality and developed the “stray remarks” doctrine, which places appropriate focus on those inappropriate remarks that are made as part of an adverse employment action.  California recently declined to follow this doctrine, at least in the way other courts have.

Earlier this summer the House Judiciary Committee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties held hearings on H.R. 3721, a/k/a the “Protecting Older Workers From Discrimination Act” (POWADA), which was introduced in the wake of the Supreme Court’s controversial 5-4 decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.  In the decision written by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court held that under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a plaintiff pursuing a disparate treatment claim for age discrimination must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employee would not have suffered an adverse employment action “but for” his age.  The Court held that the text of the ADEA did not authorize “mixed motives” claims, and that the burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer, even when there is evidence that the plaintiff’s age was a motivating factor in the adverse decision.