Hunton Retail Law Resource

On April 25, 2022, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the plaintiff’s appeal in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 266 A.3d 542 (Pa. 2021), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the increasingly contentious “consent-by-registration” theory of personal jurisdiction. The theory deems corporate defendants to have consented to general personal jurisdiction (also known as “all-purpose” jurisdiction) in a forum based solely on its registration to conduct business there. As we reported in our February 2022 article—Mitigating ...

Since the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)—and particularly in light of the Court’s more recent decisions in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) and BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017)—courts across the country have applied a more exacting standard for assessing whether defendants can be subject to general personal jurisdiction in a particular forum. Under this standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s contacts with the forum are so continuous and systematic as to render it “essentially at home” there. In most instances, a company is “essentially at home” only in the state where it is incorporated and the state where it operates its principal place of business. This has been a largely positive result for companies in the retail product industry that may have strategic incentive to avoid becoming subject to “all purpose” general personal jurisdiction in each state in which their products are sold.

In August 2016, the Supreme Court of California issued its decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Superior Court, which – as detailed more fully in our earlier post – features an expansive interpretation of specific personal jurisdiction that is difficult to reconcile with the U.S. Supreme Court’s general personal jurisdiction decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). Those decisions significantly limited the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over defendant corporations to their state of incorporation and principal place of business unless “exceptional circumstances” exist. 

Over the past two years, Hunton & Williams has been carefully monitoring the application of Daimler AG v. Bauman in trial and appellate courts throughout the country. The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Daimler decision articulated a standard that significantly limits the types of contacts sufficient to subject a defendant to general jurisdiction in a particular forum. Under that standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s contacts with the forum are so continuous and systematic as to render it “essentially at home” there. In most instances, a company is “essentially at home” only in the state where it is incorporated and the state where it operates its principal place of business. Since the opinion was issued, the risk of a company becoming subject to general jurisdiction outside its home states has substantially decreased—a largely positive outcome for companies in the retail products industry that have traditionally been subject to “all purpose” general jurisdiction in each state where they conduct business.