1. Introduction: NSS Priorities and the Strategic Resource Race

The US National Security Strategy (“2025 NSS”)[1] brings the Western Hemisphere to the forefront of American foreign policy, linking US security directly to reliable access to critical minerals—copper, lithium, and rare earths—in Latin America. This strategic focus coincides with a worldwide surge in demand for these resources, placing the region at the heart of international competition and supply chain reconfiguration. Recognizing these stakes, the 2025 NSS calls for a far more proactive US presence, both politically and financially, in Latin American mining and infrastructure.

Forecasts from S&P Global and the International Energy Agency warn of a looming gap between projected supplies of copper, cobalt, and lithium and the needs of the energy transition by 2030. Meeting this demand will require not only new mines (greenfield) and/or expanding or improving existing mines (brownfield), but also massive investment in supporting infrastructure—especially energy, water, and transport systems essential for mining operations.

2. US Engagement: Agencies, Capital, and Regulation

The US approach to the Western Hemisphere, as detailed in the 2025 NSS, is centered on strengthening supply chains for critical resources to bolster American economic resilience. Per 2024 US Geological Survey estimates, the United States relies on imports to satisfy roughly 45% of its copper demand.[2] The situation is similar with respect to Rare Earth Elements (“REEs”) and other critical minerals.

The 2025 NSS outlines plans to collaborate with regional allies to develop and protect strategic resources, and emphasizes that US agencies will proactively identify resource and investment opportunities, coordinating across government financing programs to facilitate US business involvement. Further illustrating the administration’s commitment, President Trump announced Project Vault in February 2026, a new initiative to establish a strategic reserve of critical minerals and further secure supply chains for US industry.[3] 

In direct support of these objectives, the NSS designates the DFC as a key actor in these efforts. On December 18 of last year, the DFC secured a six-year reauthorization and expanded authorities with President Trump’s signing of the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization, enabling a much more active DFC presence in Latin America: in addition to increased funding capacity, many prior restrictions on eligible countries have been lifted. These changes pave the way for rapid deployment of financing in higher-income Latin American countries with substantial mineral resources (and more developed existing infrastructure), such as Chile, Argentina, and Brazil.

Moreover, the DFC already brings relevant experience from its involvement in both (a) critical minerals transactions—such as the financing of the Pela Ema rare earth project in Brazil, its investment in the Orion Critical Mineral Consortium, and the prospective joint venture for trading minerals sourced in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”)[4]—and (b) related infrastructure projects, including the financing of the Lobito Corridor rail as part of the DRC peace process. These activities position the DFC as a well-prepared and credible player in the region’s evolving mining landscape.

3. Latin American Mining: Demand, Competition, and Challenges

Latin America is experiencing a pronounced uptick in mining activity that may soon be described as a boom. Lithium production in Argentina, copper extraction in Chile and Peru, and rare earth exploration in Brazil are all expanding rapidly. As of February 2026, copper prices were among the highest in a decade, underscoring both the scale of demand and the urgency of new investment.

The market is responding: Chile's Copper Commission (Cochilco) projects a copper mining investment pipeline of approximately $100 billion over the next decade, with $25 billion in new investments.[5] Most of the investments in the pipeline, however, are brownfield expansions, highlighting the challenges of bringing new, greenfield projects online. In Argentina, Glencore has applied for the RIGI (Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones)[6] mechanism for the $9.5 billion El Pachón/Alumbrera copper project—set to become one of the world’s largest. The $4.5 billion Agua Rica project (copper, molybdenum, gold, and silver) is also advancing, and a major Rio Tinto-backed lithium project is working towards financing. These developments are testing grounds for new regulatory frameworks and investment incentives in the region.

Geopolitical competition, especially from Chinese state-owned enterprises and other global actors, continues to shape the landscape. The SQM-Codelco lithium partnership in Chile, which includes a significant Chinese stake via Tianqi Lithium, exemplifies the region’s strategic significance. REEs provide an even more evident illustration: China controls 35% of global reserves, 70% of extraction, and 87% of processing capacity[7], and recently imposed export bans (which were rolled back just in November 2025). on key elements such as gallium, germanium, and antimony to the US—highlighting the risks of concentrated supply chains.

Beyond mining operations, substantial investment in a broad host of infrastructure is essential. Ports, railways, roads, energy supply, and especially water are critical for mining in arid regions like northern Chile and western Argentina. Chile leads with its first generation of desalination projects for mining, and projects such as the Antofagasta water reuse initiative by Sacyr are paving the way for more sustainable operations.

4. DFIs and Critical Minerals

In addition to DFC, multilateral institutions in which the United States is a shareholder are also re-evaluating their approach in respect of mining and Latin America. Whereas, only a few years ago, these organizations might have been hesitant to support extractive projects, it is now widely recognized that sustainable mining is essential for achieving not only energy transition, which relies greatly on electrification, but is also critical for national security, energy dominance and supply chain resilience. Multilateral involvement extends beyond direct investment—these institutions are instrumental in supporting technological innovation, advising governments on best practices, and fostering public-private collaboration to enable responsible mining development. Importantly, DFIs also may provide a strategic advantage, in a landscape where geopolitics is increasingly relevant, by offering geopolitical leverage.

5. Conclusion

The 2025 NSS makes clear the intention of the United States to be a proactive player in Latin America’s mining sector, combining policy, capital, and agency coordination to secure critical mineral supply chains. The US historical capacity to act quickly and decisively should not be underestimated, especially in the context of intensifying global competition. For industry players, investors that understand how DFIs will be involved in the race for critical minerals—and can forge strategic partnerships with these actors—are likely to be better positioned to benefit from the coming wave of investment.

[1] Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

[2] See https://tableau.usgs.gov/views/MCS2025_Workbook_01-28-2025_Public/MCSDashboard?%3Aembed=y&%3Aiid=1&%3AisGuestRedirectFromVizportal=y

[3] See https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/03/trump-stockpile-critical-minerals-reserve-project-vault.html

[4] See https://www.dfc.gov/media/press-releases/dfc-highlights-landmark-critical-minerals-investments-strengthen-us-national

[5] https://www.cochilco.cl/web/informe-cartera-de-proyectos-de-inversion-minera-2025-2034/

[6] RIGI (Régimen de Incentivo para Grandes Inversiones) is a Argentine legal framework enacted by the current administration in 2024 designed to attract and facilitate large-scale investments by offering tax incentives, regulatory stability, and streamlined administrative processes for projects exceeding USD 200 million. For more details, see: https://cnyor.cancilleria.gob.ar/es/6-r%C3%A9gimen-de-incentivo-para-grandes-inversiones-rigi-gu%C3%ADa-para-inversores

[7] See Brooke Escobar et al., Power Playbook: Beijing’s Bid to Secure Overseas Transition Minerals, AidData at William & Mary, 4 (January 2025).