As we previously reported, in September 2026, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed to amend Rule 14a-8 governing shareholder proposals. If Rule 14a-8 is ultimately repealed after the public comment period closes on November 20, 2026, a primary consequence of rescission would be to return governance of the shareholder proposal process to state corporation law. On November 9, 2026, the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association released a white paper and discussion draft of proposed amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) that would become effective if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded. The proposed statute would not be in place for the 2027 proxy season.
The proposed Delaware statute would:
- Impose ownership thresholds meaningfully larger than Rule 14a-8 ($250,000 for an individual);
- Be limited to precatory proposals;
- Limit the number of precatory proposals that could be included in a proxy statement to between one and three proposals, depending on the company’s size; and
- Apply only to large-cap publicly traded companies (minimum market capitalization of $30 billion).
Proposed DGCL Section 214
The discussion draft would add a new DGCL Section 214 that would create a substantive right of access for stockholders to include “precatory proposals” in the proxy statements of large-cap Delaware corporations. The discussion draft defines “precatory proposal” as:
any business proposed by any one or more stockholders that is solely advisory in nature or in the nature of a request for action by the corporation or its board of directors, officers, employees or agents, including a request to prepare a report or other disclosure to be disseminated to stockholders, which in each case shall not include a nomination of one or more persons for director election and shall not include a proposal, statement or recommendation that stockholders vote against, or stockholders withhold authority from a proxy holder to vote for, the election of one or more persons for director election.
As a result, the statutory process would not be available for binding proposals, such as a bylaw amendment or a proposal to remove a director.
The attached chart summarizes key provisions of the Delaware proposal.
Some Further Thoughts
Because SEC Rule 14a-8 has occupied the field of shareholder proposals since the 1940s, state corporate law has traditionally played a secondary role in the shareholder proposal arena, typically intervening only to evaluate whether a proposal unlawfully infringes on board authority or recommends an illegal act. In Delaware, neither the text of the DGCL nor Delaware court decisions have determined whether stockholders hold an inherent state-law entitlement to present non-binding proposals at an annual meeting. Accordingly, a rescission of Rule 14a-8 would leave corporations and shareholders without default ground rules.
Compounding this issue is the unsettled boundary of private ordering. Delaware has developed no framework to evaluate whether governing documents can regulate or eliminate precatory submissions. Although the Court of Chancery has sustained advance notice bylaws that impose reasonable procedural hurdles, these precedents govern stockholder actions involving binding business and explicitly exempt Rule 14a-8 submissions. Delaware courts have thus never been called upon to decide whether corporate charters or bylaws may validly restrict the presentation of advisory stockholder resolutions.
Other states are in a similar position. Prior to the SEC’s proposed repeal of Rule 14a-8, Texas adopted several amendments to the Texas Business Organizations Code in 2025 impacting publicly traded companies incorporated in Texas, including the new Section 21.373 imposing ownership thresholds, continuous holding requirements, and solicitation requirements for shareholders to submit proposals for approval at a shareholder meeting. Covered Texas corporations must affirmatively elect in their governing documents to be subject to Section 21.373. But this provision was drafted before the SEC’s proposal, and no state has amended its corporation law to address the potential repeal of Rule 14a-8.
Notably, unlike Rule 14a-8, proposed Section 214 would establish three tiers of corporations: (1) those with a market capitalization (as calculated under the proposed statute) in excess of $100 billion, (2) those with a market capitalization between $50 billion and $100 billion, and (3) those with a market capitalization between $30 billion and $50 billion. Corporations in the first tier would be limited to three precatory proposals, those in the second tier would be limited to two precatory proposals, and those in the third tier would be limited to one precatory proposal. Precatory proposals would be prohibited at corporations with a market capitalization below $30 billion.
The proposal also imposes more stringent ownership requirements than Rule 14a-8. To be eligible to submit a precatory proposal, a proponent must beneficially own (1) at least $250,000 in market value of voting stock individually or (2) together with up to nine co-filers, at least $1 million in market value of voting stock, in each case for 365 days as of the date that is 30 days prior to the submission deadline. A proponent may only submit a single precatory proposal for a particular annual meeting. The proposal includes limited opt-out rights, but generally would prohibit Delaware corporations from otherwise limiting or expanding rights to submit precatory proposals.
Next Steps
The Delaware proposal is further subject to a 60-day public comment period. The Council of the Corporation Law Section specifically solicited comments on aspects of the proposal. The proposal may well change as a result of this comment process.
Once the Council reaches a final recommendation on draft legislation, the Section and then the Executive Committee of the Delaware State Bar Association must issue their approval. At that point, the draft legislation would be recommended to the Delaware General Assembly. Its prospects for passage into law are uncertain at this time. In addition, it is not clear what would happen if the repeal of Rule 14a-8 has been stayed pending litigation.