Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog

Over the past two weeks the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has taken notable steps in its larger effort to address and develop a uniform framework for automated vehicles (AVs). Last week NHTSA published a request for public comment on an exemption application which, if granted, would exempt certain AVs from safety requirements and enable large-scale deployment of these vehicles nationwide. This development was closely followed by NHTSA’s issuance of two notices of proposed rulemakings (NPRM), which propose to exempt AVs from specific Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS). This progression suggests agency recognition of the realities of evolving technology and a corresponding willingness to take a flexible approach to the applicability of certain FMVSSs to AVs.

A New Mexico Court of Appeals decision illustrates that when a policy term is undefined and ambiguous, the term must be interpreted liberally and in favor of coverage. In Kane v. Syndicate 2623-623 Lloyd’s of London, 2025 WL 1733046 (N.M. Ct. App. June 16, 2025), the court affirmed summary judgment for a policyholder and held that a cyber liability policy afforded coverage for the policyholder’s loss that resulted from a post-breach fraudulent funds transfer because the preposition “for” was broad enough to afford coverage for a third party claim resulting from a security breach.

Businesses decide to switch liability insurers or obtain higher policy limits for various reasons. In doing so, policyholders should exercise caution to avoid future claim denials (or even policy recission) based on so-called “prior knowledge” issues. Prior knowledge comes into play when the policyholder knew about facts, incidents, or circumstances that occurred before the policy incepted, which can lead to problems if the insurer asserts that the policyholder had “prior knowledge” of an incident before seeking new coverage, limits, or policies.

On June 18, 2025, the Supreme Court decided Oklahoma v. EPA and EPA v. Calumet, a pair of cases that focus on the Clean Air Act’s (CAA or Act) venue selection provisions.

The judicial review provisions of the Act send review of “nationally applicable” EPA actions to the DC Circuit and review of “locally or regionally applicable” EPA actions to the regional circuits. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). However, in an exception to that rule, venue may lie in the DC Circuit for regionally applicable actions that are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” In the Court’s two recent decisions, it explained that the CAA venue analysis called for a two-step inquiry. First, courts must decide whether the EPA action is nationally applicable or only locally or regionally applicable; if nationally applicable, the case belongs in the DC Circuit. Second, if locally or regionally applicable, courts must decide whether the case falls within the exception for “nationwide scope or effect” to override the default rule of regional circuit review.