Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog

On December 14, 2015, a federal court in California denied Evanston Insurance Company’s motion to dismiss Uber’s breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims. Evanston Insurance Company v. Uber Technologies, No. 15-cv-03988-WHA (Dec. 14, 2015). The case concerns Evanston’s duty to indemnify Uber for claims arising from two car accidents during which drivers were allegedly logged on to the Uber App.

A federal judge in Indiana recently found that an insurer is not entitled to control the defense of its insured because a conflict of interest exists where the insurer is in litigation with the insured over an alleged policy breach arising out of the manner in which underlying litigation would be defended. Valley Forge Insurance Co. v. Hartford Iron & Metal Inc., et al., No. 1:14-cv-00006-RLM-SLC, N.D. Ind. (Dec. 7, 2015).

At present, the general rule is that an insurer that breaches its duty to defend still may contest coverage. Signature Dev. Companies, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 230 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000). However, the tides may soon change. The Discussion Draft of the Restatement of the Law on Liability Insurance proposes that “[a]n insurer that breaches the duty to defend a claim loses the right to assert any control over the defense or settlement of the claim and the right to contest coverage for the claim.” See § 19, “Consequences of Breach of the Duty to Defend, ALI Restatement of the Law: Liability Insurance, Discussion Draft (April 30, 2015), p. 147. The proposed Restatement explains, “[t]he forfeiture-of-coverage-defense rule discourages insurers from attempting to convert a duty-to-defend policy into an after-the-fact defense-cost-reimbursement policy.” Id. at 148. The Restatement further explains that insurers should be wary to outright deny a defense. Rather, it suggests that “[t]he proper procedure is to provide a defense subject to a reservation of rights and then, if appropriate, institute a declaratory-judgment action to terminate the duty to defend…If the insurer cannot, or does not choose to, file a declaratory-judgment action, it can preserve its coverage defenses by refusing to settle the claim while continuing to provide a defense (subject to the risks attendant to breach of the duty to make reasonable settlement decisions).” Id. at 149.¹

The Georgia Court of Appeals held on November 20, 2015, that compliance with an excess liability policy’s notice provision is not a precedent to coverage. Plantation Pipe Line Co. v. Stonewall Insurance Co., No. A15A1359 (Nov. 20, 2015 Ga. App., 3rd Div.). In Plantation Pipeline, the insured sought coverage for ground contamination originating from a 1976 pipeline leak. The leak was fixed and remediated shortly after it was discovered. In 2009, Plantation discovered further contamination at the site, which it again remediated. Plantation sought coverage for the remediation. Stonewall denied coverage based on the policy’s notice provision, contending that notice of the leak and remediation was untimely. The parties cross-moved for summary and the trial court granted Stonewall’s motion. On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Plantation’s notice was not timely as it did not report the claim to Stonewall for more than two years. However, the majority agreed with Plantation that the notice provision does not “expressly stipulate that compliance with the notice provision is a condition precedent to coverage.” The panel further found that “the policy does not even contain a general provision that no action will lie against Stonewall unless, as a condition precedent thereto, Plantation shall have fully complied with all terms of the policy.” Thus, the panel found it was error for the trial court to preclude coverage based on a failure to provide timely notice.

A federal court in Virginia recently held in Travelers Casualty and Surety Company v. Schur, No. 3:15CV60-HEH (E.D.Va., Nov. 24, 2015), that a liability insurer’s so-called “business pursuits” and “known falsity” exclusions do not preclude a defense against defamation allegations where the allegations raised at least a potential for coverage under the policy.  The decision illustrates the continued application of Virginia’s “eight corners” and “potentiality” rules, which mandate a narrow application of the underlying allegations against the language of the policy and require a defense if any allegation raises even a potentiality for coverage.

The Supreme Court of Texas has ruled that CERCLA enforcement proceedings brought by the EPA are a “suit” as that term is used in commercial general liability insurance policies.  In doing so, Texas joins the majority of other jurisdictions to consider the issue. McGinnes Industrial Maintenance Corp. v. The Phoenix Insurance Co., No. 14-0465 (Tex. June 26, 2015).

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in KF 103-CV v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-1403 (10th Cir. Oct. 29, 2015), that a general liability insurer owed a defense to a real estate developer who allegedly trespassed on nearby easements, causing a loss of use of those easements and a diminution in value to the dominant property.  The decision illustrates the expansive defense coverage owed under ordinary general liability insurance, with coverage extending to claims alleging only a loss of use or property value.

Background 

Judges – Not Juries – Award Attorney’s Fees In Virginia Bad Faith Cases, FC&S Legal
November 10, 2015

In REVI, LLC v. Chicago Title Insurance Company, the Virginia Supreme Court held that a trial judge, rather than a jury, should determine whether an insured is entitled to attorney’s fees as a result of the insurer’s bad faith.

Insurers To Indemnify $132 Million Loss From Train Collision Allegedly Caused By Texting Engineer, FC&S Legal
November 9, 2015

In Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London et al. v. Connex Railroad LLC, a Los Angeles trial court found that an insurer must indemnify its insured railroad for $132 million in claims arising out of a commuter train collision caused by alleged texting by engineer.  In finding for the insured, the court rejected application of the policies' "intentional acts" exclusion, holding that the exclusion only applies where the insured would have known that ...

Maryland’s Court of Special Appeals recently ruled in James G. Davis Construction Corporation v. Erie Insurance Exchange¹ that a subcontractor’s insurer was obligated to defend the general contractor against allegations that it was negligent in its supervision of the subcontractor. In doing so, the court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the general contractor was covered only for claims of vicarious liability for the subcontractor’s actions.