Hunton Retail Law Resource

On June 18, 2025, the Supreme Court decided Oklahoma v. EPA and EPA v. Calumet, a pair of cases that focus on the Clean Air Act’s (CAA or Act) venue selection provisions.

The judicial review provisions of the Act send review of “nationally applicable” EPA actions to the DC Circuit and review of “locally or regionally applicable” EPA actions to the regional circuits. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). However, in an exception to that rule, venue may lie in the DC Circuit for regionally applicable actions that are “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect.” In the Court’s two recent decisions, it explained that the CAA venue analysis called for a two-step inquiry. First, courts must decide whether the EPA action is nationally applicable or only locally or regionally applicable; if nationally applicable, the case belongs in the DC Circuit. Second, if locally or regionally applicable, courts must decide whether the case falls within the exception for “nationwide scope or effect” to override the default rule of regional circuit review.

In Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court held a disabled former employee who neither “holds” nor “desires” a job is not a “qualified individual” under the ADA and, thus, cannot sue for disability discrimination following her employer’s revocation of retiree health benefits. 

Employers contemplating a forced transfer of a worker will need to grapple with a new standard set out by the US Supreme Court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the law that makes it unlawful to discriminate against workers based on various protected characteristics. The Supreme Court in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis issued an important ruling that clarifies the evidentiary standard employees must meet when asserting a discriminatory transfer claim against an employer under Title VII.   Prior to the Court’s decision, there was a Circuit split with most courts holding that an employee had to show a significant employment disadvantage to prevail on a claim that their transfer violated Title VII.  In its opinion, the Supreme Court held instead that an employee must show (i) the employer’s action was discriminatory, and (ii) that the employee suffered “some harm” respecting an “identifiable term or condition of employment” to state a claim for discrimination under Title VII.  The majority noted that the Court’s “some harm” standard is a downward departure from the type of evidence that lower courts had traditionally required to show discrimination under Title VII – namely, that an employee must suffer “significant,” “material,” or “serious” harm to have an actionable claim. 

The United States Supreme Court recently held in Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, that choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts, including maritime insurance policies, are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law. In Great Lakes, a policyholder asserted counterclaims against its insurer under the state law of Pennsylvania, where the insurer had filed a federal-court action seeking a declaration of no coverage, even though the choice-of-law provision in the applicable maritime insurance policy designated New York law. The policyholder argued that Pennsylvania had the greatest interest in the dispute, and that enforcing the New York choice-of-law provision in the policy would contravene Pennsylvania’s fundamental public policy. The district court dismissed the policyholder’s counterclaims, but the Third Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case, and we explained here that the Court’s decision could have significant ramifications for insurance-coverage disputes both under maritime insurance policies and more generally if the Court adopted broad rules regarding the enforcement of choice-of-law provisions.