Hunton Employment & Labor Perspectives

The Fourth Circuit recently issued a significant ruling in Thomas v. EOTech, LLC, holding that private employers cannot contractually "speed up" the expiration of the time limit to seek federal administrative and judicial redress under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The court joined the Sixth Circuit in concluding that enforcing such agreements would disrupt the "carefully integrated and uniform remedial schemes" established by Congress.

In the case, Plaintiff, a former employee of EOTech, signed an agreement as a condition of employment promising not to file any suit relating to her employment more than 180 calendar days after the disputed event. The agreement specifically noted that this 180-day period would be tolled while a charge was pending with an administrative agency, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). After she was terminated, she filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC and the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights. After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC and after 196 days had passed excluding tolling, she brought claims in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland for violations of Title VII, the ADEA, and the Maryland Fair Employment Practice Act.

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Title VII and ADEA claims. Because Title VII and the ADEA provide a longer combined statutory window (typically at least 180 to 300 days to file a charge plus an additional 90 days to sue after receiving a right-to-sue letter), the 180-day contractual limit stripped the employee of time guaranteed by federal law. Key to the Fourth Circuit’s decision was also the fact that Title VII and the ADEA do not explicitly allow parties to contractually shorten the statute of limitations period. In contrast, Maryland law does allow for contractual modification of limitations so long as there is no controlling statute to the contrary, the modification is reasonable, and defenses such as fraud, duress, or misrepresentation do not apply.

In its analysis, the court also emphasized that Title VII and the ADEA are complex remedial frameworks designed to favor "cooperation and voluntary compliance" over litigation. The court rejected EOTech’s argument that employees could simply prepare lawsuits while their EEOC charges were still pending. Indeed, the court reasoned that forcing employees to hire counsel and prepare for court during the administrative process undermines the EEOC's role in investigating, conciliating, and potentially settling disputes before they reach a federal docket. Furthermore, the court noted that many employees initiate the EEOC process pro se, and expecting laypersons to navigate contractual overrides of statutory timelines would "seriously impair the navigability" of the federal system.

In light of this ruling, employers in the Fourth Circuit (which includes Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina) should review their standard employment contracts and related documents to ensure compliance with the court’s decision. While employers may still contractually shorten the statutes of limitations for certain claims, the Fourth Circuit has now made it clear that such provisions will not be effective for Title VII or ADEA claims.