Hunton Employment & Labor Perspectives

On June 29, 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a landmark decision overruling a 90-year-old Supreme Court precedent and significantly expanding presidential power to remove members of independent agencies. In Trump v. Slaughter, No. 25-332, the Supreme Court held that the “for-cause” removal protections applicable to commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) are unconstitutional and inconsistent with the separation of powers doctrine. Although the Supreme Court’s decision concerned FTC commissioners, its reasoning is likely to have broader consequences for other multimember agencies whose leaders have traditionally been protected from at-will removal. For employers, the most immediate implications may be at agencies such as the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), where changes in leadership could now occur more quickly and bring faster shifts in enforcement priorities, regulatory policy, and litigation risk.

Trump v. Slaughter - The Case Background

Shortly after the start of President Trump’s second term in 2025, he removed FTC Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter without invoking the FTC Act’s statutory standard permitting removal only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Rather than identifying any such cause, the President stated that Slaughter’s continued service was inconsistent with the Administration’s priorities.

Slaughter then filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief restoring her to office, contending that her removal was unlawful. The district court agreed, concluding that existing Supreme Court precedent—most notably Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)—barred the President from removing an FTC commissioner at will. The Administration appealed and argued that the FTC’s statutory removal protections are unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari before judgment and blocked Slaughter’s reinstatement while the case proceeded.

Prior Precedent: Myers and Humphrey’s Executor

Prior to the Trump v. Slaughter decision, commissioners appointed to the FTC could only be removed by the President for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” That statutory for-cause protection reflected a long-settled understanding that FTC commissioners were not subject to at-will presidential removal. 

That framework rested on two Supreme Court cases pointing in different directions. In Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), the Court recognized a general rule that the President may remove executive officers as part of his Article II authority to supervise those who execute federal law. Nine years later, however, the Court held in Humphrey’s Executor that this rule did not apply to FTC commissioners. The Court reasoned that the FTC performed “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” functions, rather than exercising executive power in the ordinary sense, and therefore could be insulated from direct presidential control through for-cause removal protections.  

For decades, Humphrey’s Executor served as a cornerstone of the legal framework supporting the structure of independent agencies. It was widely understood to permit Congress to create multimember commissions whose leaders could not be removed by the President except for specified cause. Although later Supreme Court decisions had narrowed that framework and cautioned that Humphrey’s Executor should be read on its own terms, the case remained an important source of protection for officials serving on independent agencies such as the FTC.

The Supreme Court’s 6-3 Decision in Trump v. Slaughter

In a landmark 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court concluded that the FTC Act’s for-cause removal protection for commissioners violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. The majority emphasized that Article II of the Constitution vests the executive power in the President and that agency officials who exercise that power must remain accountable to the President for the President to carry out his duties effectively. As the Court put it, “[t]o remain accountable to the President, those officers must be removable by the President.” The Court made the point even more directly in explaining that, “[a]lthough it is up to the Senate to decide whether to confirm those with whom the President would prefer to work, neither Congress nor the courts may saddle him with those with whom he cannot work.”

In reaching that conclusion, the Court expressly overruled Humphrey’s Executor. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the modern FTC wields expansive rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicatory authority, placing it “well within the heartland of executive power.” On that view, Congress may not insulate FTC commissioners from presidential removal when they exercise powers for which the President is ultimately constitutionally responsible.

Implications for Employers

Although the Supreme Court’s decision concerned FTC commissioners, the overruling of Humphrey’s Executor will likely have consequences for other multimember agencies, including those that regulate the workplace, such as the NLRB. Employers should expect renewed challenges to agency structure, more direct presidential control over agency leadership, and potentially sharper shifts in enforcement priorities as administrations change. 

The potential implications are coming into focus for the NLRB. The D.C. Circuit recently upheld President Trump’s removal of former Board Member Gwynne Wilcox and concluded that the NLRB’s authority to issue rules, shape policy through adjudication, and litigate independently places the agency outside the traditional Humphrey’s Executor framework. In light of the Court’s decision in Trump v. Slaughter, the President’s removal of Wilcox now appears to be on much firmer constitutional footing, and the decision strongly suggests that future administrations may have greater freedom to reshape the NLRB without traditional cause-based limitations on removal.

The decision may also affect other pending legal challenges to the NLRB’s structure. Several courts are currently hearing constitutional challenges brought against the NLRB, and the decision in Trump v. Slaughter appears to strengthen presidential-control arguments against Board members’ for-cause removal protections in those cases. More broadly, the decision is likely to result in more litigation over agency authority going forward, particularly as courts continue to reassess the scope and independence of federal agencies.

Employers should continue to closely monitor agency leadership changes and related case law developments in this area because those developments are likely to shape enforcement priorities, regulatory stability, and workplace litigation risk.